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Abstract 
 
This research note focuses on the relationship between organised crime and 
corruption in Italy. It is part of a wider research project investigating that relationship 
across a number of European countries. In the first part of this contribution, along 
with a brief account of definitional issues, a summary review of previous work on the 
connections between organised crime and corruption is provided. The paper then 
attempts to delineate the uniqueness of the Italian case through some observations 
around the specific contours of organised and corrupt exchange in the country as they 
manifest themselves. After a brief methodological note, the analysis is interspersed 
with the opinions of key informants contacted for this research who have profound 
knowledge of the subject matter, having worked for many years as investigating 
judges or academic researchers. A division into areas in which the links between 
organised crime and corruption are observed tries to map the two phenomena and 
their joint modus operandi. 
 
Introduction  
 
The long history of the definition of organised crime is far from over (Fijnaut and 
Paoli, 2004). This specific from of criminality has been described by a number of 
North American institutional agencies as ‘an alien threat’ and a ‘conspiracy to commit 
crimes for profit on a continuing basis’ (Kefauver Committee, 1951; Cressey, 1969). 
However, the fact that organised criminal activity is not necessarily organised crime 
has long complicated the definitional process, while the adoption of concepts 
elaborated within strictly institutional contexts has been harshly criticised (Albini, 
1971; Chambliss, 1978; Block, 1991; Smith, 1991; Abadinsky, 1990; Calder, 1992). 
Traditionally, some definitions hinge on mere quantitative aspects: the number of 
individuals involved in a criminal group is said to determine the organisational degree 
of that group (Johnson, 1962; Ferracuti, 1988). Some others focus mainly on a 
temporal variable, that is the time-span during which illegal activities are conducted, 
or on the larger scale of the illegal operations carried out when compared with 
conventional crime (Moore, 1987; Ianni, 1972). Criminologists have also focused on 
the specific ‘services’ provided by organised crime, be these protection or trust, and 
on its purported evolution leading it from a predatory to a parasitic and, finally, to a 
symbiotic stage (McIntosh, 1975; Gambetta, 1992;  Peterson, 1991). It is felt that 
legal definitions and rigid classificatory criteria may leave little space for nuanced 
studies, while proposed definitions such as ‘serious crime’, which attempt to simplify 
the issue, are said to produce an unwarranted narrowing of the analytical focus (Van 
Duyne and Van Dijck, 2007). 
   Corruption is commonly defined as abuse of public power for private profit and is 
said to occur in the interface between economic interest and the political apparatus, 
determining an inefficient use of resources (Rose-Ackerman, 1999). Other definitions 
focus less on ‘inefficiency’ than on the illegality of the profits pursued and on the 
illegitimacy of the conducts adopted. Corruption, however, may not limit its aim to 
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the pursuit of profit and wealth, but also to the acquisition of status or power (Nye, 
1967). Some authors categorise it by degree of social acceptance and utilise a colour-
coding system indicating as ‘white’ socially acceptable and ‘black’ as socially 
unacceptable episodes (Heidenheimer, 1989; Gounev and Bezlov, 2009). Corruption 
may be deemed systemic when is engrained in institutions and widespread in society 
to the point of affecting the day-to-day interactions among citizens and between these 
and their institutional representatives. By contrast, it may be described as sporadic 
when it involves individuals who are swiftly identified and censored. The concept of 
‘machine politics’ has helped analysing corruption within the functionalist tradition, 
with authors stressing that even ‘political rackets’ can satisfy ‘the needs of diverse 
subgroups in the larger community which are not adequately satisfied by legally 
devised and culturally approved social structures’ (Merton, 1968: 126). Some scholars 
have argued that corruption is a vestigial survival of the past, and is destined to be 
swept away by progress and development (Wilson, 1990). Others have opted for an 
analysis of the economic costs of corruption or for the specific victimisation processes 
that it engenders (Rose-Ackerman, 1978; Ruggiero, 2000).  
    As for the relationship between organised crime and corruption, this has been 
focused upon in studies which emphasise the centrality of corrupt exchange for any  
organised criminal activity. Corruption, therefore, may be seen as a major 
characteristic of organised crime itself, as its provision of illicit goods and services 
needs some form of connivance or protection on the part of official actors. Organised 
crime, moreover, may attempt to corrupt representatives of institutional agencies with 
a view to avoiding prosecution or to gaining access to markets and resources (Maltz, 
1994; Finkenauer, 2005; Gounev and Bezlov, 2009). Authors have also attempted, 
with debatable results, to link organised crime and corruption in a statistical fashion, 
and to prove how both relate to the quality of the criminal justice system and to 
overall economic performance of specific countries (Buscaglia and Van Dijk, 2003; 
Van Dijk, 2007). 
    Against the backdrop of the literature summarily mentioned above, it is worth 
locating the Italian case in some detail. 
 
Background 
 
Criminal organisations 
 
For an understanding of organised crime in Italy, a preliminary distinction may be 
useful. There are organisations mainly engaged in conventional illicit business, such 
as prostitution, gambling, smuggling, the supply of drugs, and so on. These 
organisations are criminal enterprises or syndicates operating in illegal markets, in the 
so-called underworld, where they promote, or respond to, demand for prohibited 
goods. On the other hand, there are organisations which do not limit their operations 
to the realm of illicit markets, but gain access to the overworld, namely to the official 
economic and political spheres. The latter types of organisations, through their 
simultaneous presence in legitimate and illegitimate domains, exert territorial control 
and constitute ‘power systems’ which transcend conventional criminality. The very 
phrase organised crime, in Italy, mainly refers to this latter type, exemplified by 
organisations such as the Sicilian Mafia, the Camorra in the Campania region and the 
‘Ndrangheta in the Calabria region. The relatively recent development of another 
organisation operating in the Puglia region, the Sacra Corona Unita, is said to be the 
outcome of the influence of the Camorra in the region, where local groups claimed 
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and slowly achieved independence from the Neapolitan organisation. It is 
controversial whether the Sacra Corona Unita adopted the typical rituals 
characterising the ‘secret brotherhoods’ from Sicily and Campania as the result of 
sheer mimicking, or whether such rituals belonged to a pre-existent underworld 
subculture in the region (Massari, 1998). It is also hard to establish the degree to 
which this group operating in Puglia is capable of forming partnerships with official 
economic and political actors like their counterparts in Sicily and Campania. The 
groups that are certainly unable to do so are formed by non-indigenous members or 
networks, over which a lot of investigative and scholarly work is yet to be produced, 
and on which I shall return shortly.  
   With respect to the major Italian organisations, it should be noted that the awareness 
of their constitution as ‘power systems’ dates back to the nineteenth century. For 
example, in 1876, member of parliament Leopoldo Franchetti described the mafia as a 
form of political crime promoted by sectors of the ruling class, namely official 
political actors and businessmen. Elite groups were said to employ members of the 
‘military mafia’ and to use them as an illegal resource in their economic or political 
activity. Violence was used for the discouragement of economic competitors and the 
intimidation of political opponents (Scarpinato, 2004). The groups lending their 
strong arm to official actors, in exchange, were granted a relative freedom to operate 
in other illegal activities (mainly protection racket and contraband). Similarly, the 
Camorra, at the time of the unification of the Italian peninsula (1860-61), was 
entrusted with the task of maintaining public order, as the regular police had been sent 
to back up Garibaldi’s army. The authority of the camorristi, in fact, became accepted 
by many as the only power likely to guarantee order in a situation of war, when 
internal conflict breaching every rule could easily take place. The Camorra was then 
playing the role of a broker, acting as a mediator between a turbulent society and the 
official authorities, a role destined to evolve significantly in the years to come 
(Ruggiero, 1993; Behan, 1996; Barbagallo, 1999). 
   These two examples provide enough material to suggest the following 
conceptualisation. In order to identify the different interpretations of organised crime, 
it is useful to refer to the concept of social organisation. This concept relates to the 
variety of social relations which give rise to two types of networks. First, social 
organisation can be viewed as an association, a network of individuals who form 
some sort of culturally homogenous group. Second, social organisation can be seen as 
a series of transactions, a network of individuals involved in a common activity, 
whether or not they belong to the same association, in other words, whether or not 
they are socially and culturally homogenous. Transactions range from brief 
encounters to elaborate, rigid, and highly coordinated undertakings. If we view social 
organisation in terms of association, we emphasise the structure and internal 
cohesiveness of groups. On the contrary, if we view social organisation in terms of 
transactions we emphasise the structure and modality of joint activities. 
   Some scholars, but also investigators, choose the first route, thus describing the 
criminal groups as separate entities constituted by cohesive enclaves and characterised 
by specific cultural codes. Others opt for the second route, therefore focusing on the 
links the criminal group establishes with external, mainly official actors with whom 
joint activities are carried out (for this approach, among many others, see Arlacchi, 
1983; Ruggiero, 1996; Armao, 2000; Dino, 2008; Lodato and Scarpinato, 2008). 
   Those who choose the second route may highlight the capacity of organised crime 
to polarise markets through the use of violence, thus implying that the ‘military’ 
aspects of this type of crime are still very important. Others look specifically at the 
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alliances and partnerships between organised crime, the official economy and the 
political world, and therefore suggest that organised crime combines forms of 
conventional criminality with a variety of white collar offences. This happens, in 
particular, when proceeds from illicit activities are invested in the official economy, 
where members of criminal groups are said to ‘learn’ the techniques and the 
rationalisations of their white collar counterparts. In this way, one could say, these 
groups do not corrupt markets, but they are corrupted by them. In this perspective, it 
is more appropriate to talk about a number of exchanges, and a mutual entrepreneurial 
promotion in which the different actors engage. In this sense, the suggestion can be 
made that we are now faced with criminal networks, rather than organised crime, 
which involve a number of actors from the legitimate as well as the illegitimate world. 
These networks take advantage of the fact that in some sectors of the official economy 
unorthodox practices and illegal behaviour are widespread.  Criminal networks imply 
the existence of interdependent units linked by a wide-ranging variety of ties, 
including kinship, ethnicity, cultural homogeneity, social proximity, or simply 
business partnership. 
   As alluded to earlier, this is not a recent development, and dates back to the 
nineteenth century. Later, when sub-cultural theorists analysed organised crime, they 
too suggested that the most successful criminal groups were those that managed to 
establish some form of common interest with official actors (they meant the police, 
particularly). Only those who did so could, in their view, really develop the scope and 
profits of their criminal activity. The ability to operate in both the licit and the illicit 
arena allowed criminal groups to develop those multiple affiliations which could 
ensure success in both. As Cloward and Ohlin (1960) put it: apprentice criminals pass 
from one status to another in the illegitimate opportunity system, and as they do so, 
develop a set of relationships with members of the legitimate world. Unless they can 
form these relationships, the possibility of a stable, protected criminal style of life is 
effectively precluded.  
   Some observations must be made about indigenous and non-indigenous criminal 
organisations. In the literature on organised crime, when the involvement of migrants 
is examined, images and judgements recur which are often based on opinions, 
hypotheses and moral panics. Some studies set off with the premise, reiterated and 
transmitted without corroboration from one commentator to the next, that organised 
crime formed by foreigners ‘is characterised by particular forms of aggression and 
violence and the fast growth of their capacity to operate in different criminal areas’ 
(Di Nicola, 2008: 193). It is very hard to establish of what this ‘particularity’ exactly 
consists, especially in Italy where the violence and expansive force of indigenous 
organised crime is a well-known fact. A more useful strategy, perhaps, consists of 
focusing on some specific types of criminal activity, or on some specific geographical 
area, and observe the interactions that organised criminal groups formed by migrants 
establish with the new or traditional Italian organised groups. In a tentative manner, 
pending further substantiation, we might suggest that in some Italian regions foreign 
organised crime is independent from Italian criminal groups, because the latter are by 
now engaged in productive, entrepreneurial and financial activities. Other specific 
criminal sectors may have undergone a process of ‘succession’, whereby foreign 
groups occupy the space left by Italian groups who have moved on to operate 
elsewhere. In some cases, however, the succession is accompanied by the request by 
Italian groups of a percentage on the profits made by the new comers (Becucci and 
Massari, 2001; Becucci, 2006). In other areas, partnerships can be formed between 
Italian and non-Italian groups, with a division of labour based on the respective power 
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and on the capacity of the latter to access the sources of illicit goods and substances. 
In yet other areas, non-Italian groups are subordinate to Italian ones, particularly in 
contexts in which the demand for illicit goods and services is traditionally high. In 
such cases, non-Italian groups provide ‘criminal labour’ to established Italian ones. 
Finally, if we prefer to focus on the specific criminal activity in which the different 
groups specialise, we might want to investigate, for instance, whether the illegal 
transfer of people carried out by Rumanians is to be associated with the demand for 
labour by the Italian hidden economy; whether the ability of Russian groups to 
infiltrate the official economy is due to the proven willingness by official actors to 
facilitate illicit infiltration; and finally, whether the predominance of Chinese groups 
in the importation of forged goods is the effect of the particular prosperity of this 
illicit economic sector in Italy. In brief, the criminality of migrants in Italy should 
perhaps be analysed against the background of the criminogenic characteristics of the 
country (Ruggiero, 2009a). What remains evident is that non-indigenous organised 
crime is confined to conventional criminal activities, including theft, robbery, 
prostitution rackets, human trafficking, drug distribution, and all other ancillary 
activities related to the above. Organised crime involving migrants, in brief, remains a 
form of pariah organised crime. The indigenous groups, instead, are in a position to 
control the major operations of conventional criminality (mainly protection rackets 
and large drug operations) while participating in the official economic and political 
worlds. It is in these worlds that episodes of corruption occur which prompt the 
question: to what extent does organised crime impact on the spreading of corrupt 
practices in the country?  
 
Corruption 
 
Nineteenth-century Italian criminologists were fully aware of the inclination of 
powerful groups in the country to violate the law (Ruggiero, 2006). This should not 
sound surprising: most members of the Positive School were politically left-leaning 
and warned that ‘the bourgeois tyranny’ would soon deny human and civil rights to 
citizens (Pietro Ellero); that the elite was giving shape to ‘new’ forms of criminality, 
more devastating than the old ones (Cesare Lombroso); and that the ruling classes, 
with their contempt for legality, would dictate the moral (or immoral) tone of the 
entire country  (Enrico Ferri).  
    In the annual report produced by the State Audit Board (the Corte dei Conti 
composed by judges who advise the Treasury) in 2008, there was no sign that 
corruption, through payments given to politicians by entrepreneurs in exchange for 
public contracts, was subsiding (Il Sole 24 Ore, 4 February 2008). The most worrying 
aspect underlined by the Board, however, was the reiterated practice of granting 
amnesties to those charged with corrupt behaviour, who are in this way regularly 
rescued before a criminal sentence can be pronounced. Similar concerns were 
expressed by the Anti-Corruption High Commissioner, who stressed that statistics 
indicating a decline in the reported cases were not a signal of the decline of the 
phenomenon, but rather of the growing tolerance towards it. Incidentally, the recent 
programme aimed at simplifying and shrinking the national bureaucratic apparatus 
included, among other measures, the suppression of the figure of High Commissioner 
(Unimondo.org, 2008). 
   Transparency International, in March 2009, remarked that in Italy corruption is the 
only industry that does not experience a crisis. In the year 2002, the country was listed 
at the 31
st
 place in the table drawn through the ‘perceived corruption index’, while in 
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2008 it was placed at the 55
th
 place. With regard to the ‘bribe payers index’, Italy also 
occupied a low position: 17
th
 out of 22 countries. This index measures the propensity 
of companies from the top industrialised countries to use corrupt methods when 
operating abroad. The argument was also made that, given the current economic 
crisis, and given the state’s intention to inject money into a variety of public works 
which may encourage productive recovery, corruption may increase as a consequence.  
Enterprises and political representatives were said to be poised to take advantage of 
such imminent opportunities. A new Bill discussed in Parliament about banning the 
use of telephone tapping for investigations concerning corruption was also seen as a 
new incentive for perpetrators. Finally, a strong antidote to corruption was identified, 
as usual, in market competition. 
   It is indeed around the variable ‘competition’ that many episodes of corrupt 
exchange can be grouped. A typical, sensational, example, is offered by the scandal of 
the Bank of Italy. The type of illegal conduct adopted by the Bank shows how 
powerful groups and individuals may violate their own rules and philosophies. While 
officially adhering to the liberal principles of competition, general director Antonio 
Fazio accepted the bid made by banker Gianpiero Fiorani, despite the fact that a non-
Italian competitor had made a more advantageous offer to buy the Antonveneta Bank. 
Behind the national sentiment mobilised by Fazio in explaining his choice, there 
emerged a long-term partnership between him and Fiorani in numerous mutually-
enhancing financial operations (Statera, 2005). This case shows how the official 
advocates of market freedom, in fact, do not genuinely believe in the benefits of such 
freedom.  
 
Methodological note 
 
Having set the background, it is necessary to specify the source of the information 
collected below. The analysis that follows is based on  
 
a) judicial documents, namely documents produced by courts on proven cases 
leading to guilty verdicts and consequent penal sentences; 
b) journalist sources discussing proven cases or ongoing investigations and 
judicial activity; 
c) academic work discussing the above or analysing general issues around the 
causes and persistence of both corruption and organised crime; 
d) interviews with five key informants. 
 
 
Interviews were conducted with three judges, respectively a long-term mafia 
investigative judge (J1), an experienced investigative judge working in the Campania 
region (J2) and a judge sitting on the national Council of Magistrates, Consiglio 
Superiore della Magistratura, (J3). The other two key informants were senior 
academics based at the University of Palermo and the University of Turin respectively 
(A1, A2). All five informants are also known authors, as they have produced a variety 
of publications in the form of books and articles on the subject matter. Interviews 
were semi-structured and only some themes and areas were initially established, 
namely the specific sectors of social and institutional life in which organised crime 
and corruption can be read jointly. As the interviews proceeded, of course, the 
specific experience of the informants, their knowledge accumulated in investigative or 
research work, came to the fore and influenced the direction of the conversations with 
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this author, yielding supplementary information in a serendipitous fashion. The 
interviewees were willing to participate in the project and were assured that their 
identities would not be revealed.   
 
Findings 
 
Corruption 
 
The Bank of Italy case briefly described above possesses a number of traits with cases 
that occurred during the early 1990s and that can be grouped under the same 
typology. Such cases came to light during the long season of the anti-corruption 
judicial initiative known in Italy as ‘clean hands’ (Caferra, 1992; Paci, 1992; 
Pizzorno, 1992; Della Porta, 1992). Informant J3 recalled those years in the following 
terms: 
 
„In the administrative and political sector corruption is systemic. We have seen 
numerous examples since the 1970s. What became a paradigmatic case revolved 
around the interests of the oil producing companies in Italy. These companies devised 
a well organised system of corruption aimed at representatives of all political parties. 
They managed, in this way, to involve part of the parliament in passing a law which 
was blatantly favourable to them in financial terms. During the „clean hands‟ 
operations, it emerged that the money destined by the construction entrepreneurs for 
the corruption of national and local politicians was part of the budget, it was an item 
in their accounts, although this did not appear in the official balance sheets of their 
companies‟ (J3). 
 
The ‘clean hands’ phase ended in the 1990s with yet another sensational case. Lawyer 
David Mills was accused of receiving some 500,000 euros from Silvio Berlusconi in 
return for giving false evidence in two corruption trials involving the Italian prime 
minister. Only in February 2009 was Mills found guilty and given a four and a half 
year sentence, though he remains free pending appeal. In the document released by 
the court to explain the motivation of the sentence, the description is provided of  
 
‘the direct involvement of Berlusconi in the creation of 64 offshore companies 
through which various illicit funds were channelled, including the 12 million dollar 
pay-off that the Socialist leader Bettino Craxi received for approving the legislation 
that allowed Berlusconi to take more or less untrammelled control of the Italian 
airwaves’ (Jones, 2009: 23).  
 
In an additional comment by informant A1, „The current prime minister has managed 
to escape the trial because he passed a law giving the country‟s four highest office-
holders immunity from prosecution, without which he would now be heading for a 
prison cell alongside Mills‟ (A1). 
 
With the new millennium, while lesser attention is devoted by academics to corrupt 
exchange, judicial and journalistic sources indicate an exacerbation rather than an 
attenuation of the phenomenon, although the dynamics and format of corrupt 
exchange appear to become increasingly diversified. The following is a limited 
sample of cases reported by the media over the last year (Ruggiero, 2007; 2009b; 
Ministero dell’Interno, 2008). 
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- In Milan a local councillor working in the office for the protection of the 
environment builds a house, without applying for a building licence, in a 
protected area. 
- A lawyer operating in Milan, former member of the board of directors of 
Parmalat and La Scala Theatre, is arrested for acting as a straw man for a 
criminal organisation: he accepted to appear as the owner of properties and 
financial assets actually belonging to the organisation.  
- In Rome, several medical doctors are criminally charged because they 
dispense unnecessary therapies to patients with the only aim of claiming state 
reimbursement. The fraud costs the Italian state around 10M euros. Similarly, 
in Milan, some surgeons are arrested for performing undue operations merely 
with a view to claiming state funds.  
- A case coming to light in Florence indicates that municipal areas destined for 
public use are instead sold to urban developers in exchange for bribes. 
- In Turin, a number of pharmaceutical companies are accused of bribing 
politicians in order to obtain licences for the sale of useless medicines and to 
outflank laboratory control about their hazardous nature. 
- The governor of the Abruzzo region is arrested for requiring payments from 
entrepreneurs delivering services to the local health system. 
- In Naples, a businessman is arrested for virtually monopolising contracts in 
several public sectors thanks to his connections with local politicians. 
- In Turin, an investigative judge devises a network of fake consultancy 
companies run by friends or accomplices, claiming the expenses (from the 
state) for consultancy work than in fact is never carried out. A paradoxical 
aspect of this case is that this judge had previously conducted investigations 
on episodes of corruption occurring in the world of football, and it is 
reasonable to assume that, while unveiling the corruption of others, he was 
practising his own. 
- Some major energy and telephone companies (including Telecom Italia) are 
heavily fined for fraud against consumers and malpractice against competitors. 
- A case that gained international resonance occurred in Naples in 2008. The 
companies contracted with the building of a waste disposal facility were 
unable to complete the work by the agreed deadline. The contract had been 
won through unorthodox practices and with a totally unrealistic bid, offering 
the required service for extremely low, therefore dubious, prices. The 
ineptitude of the company contracted led to the infamous ‘rubbish 
emergency’.  
 
Corruption and organised crime 
 
The cases listed above cover a number of areas that criminologists would describe as 
grey areas in which politics, business and crime interact in various fashions. 
According to informant A1: 
 
„Corruption in Italy does not reveal the direct participation of organised crime such 
as, for example, the mafia. Rather, it shows the spreading of a “mafia method” in 
conducting business and doing politics. I have studied the processes of transformation 
of the Sicilian mafia for many years. I was interested in cultural aspects, namely in 
the way in which values and codes are transmitted in basic social interactions, and 
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how they colonise other life ambits. This cultural approach led me to look, first, at 
how women were involved or connived with the organisation. I then moved on to the 
political world, to see how public representatives assimilated elements of the mafia 
culture. Finally, I am now looking at how the “mafia method” is becoming the 
prevailing method inspiring the crimes of the powerful and how it affects market 
freedom and the democratic system as a whole‟ (A1). 
 
Similar description was given by informant J1, who noted that environments saturated 
by corrupt exchange offer everybody a chance to „have a go‟. In his view, corruption 
in Italy is characterised by a multiplying effect which is felt in all positions of the 
social hierarchy: „corrupt exchange involving the elite and that involving ordinary 
citizens feed upon each other‟. As corruption spreads from the elite downwards to 
other social groups, impunity seems to increase its multiplying effect. This process 
causes increasing familiarisation and tolerance with unorthodox practices, even 
among those who benefit very little from their own corrupt practices. 
 
„The opportunities granted to ordinary citizens to benefit from minor episodes of 
corruption led to the partial condoning of large-scale corruption. The tolerance of 
petty immorality on the part of the elite paved the way for the acceptance of their own 
higher immorality by the non-elite. The moral tone of the country, however, was 
imposed by the ruling class, who by relentlessly displaying their own corruption made 
everyone indifferent to official rules and cynical towards the public welfare‟ (J1).  
 
The stages of this process were addressed by informant A1, who noted that during the 
1970s corruption seemed to be confined to the margins of civil society, namely within 
a sub-system which had few occasions to interact with society as a whole. News about 
a state functionary being corrupt would cause a scandal, while corruption of 
entrepreneurs or politicians was not even contemplated, because it was not brought to 
the limelight, therefore it did not exist. 
 
„In Italy, I believe things have changed from the early 1970s, when the first 
journalistic and judicial investigations drew some light on the adventurous corrupt 
mixture of professionals, politicians, businessmen and organised crime. The 
relationships between all these actors deform the norms that should govern society, 
politics and the economy. This is when we discovered that there was not a big 
distance between those who corrupt, those who are corrupted, and civil society. The 
idea that there are parallel worlds, distinct and separate, was a delusion. As it is a 
delusion to think that there is one professional sector more or less immune than 
others to corrupt practices‟ (A1).  
 
This aspect was also highlighted by the organisation ‘Help Consumatori’ (2007), that 
informs consumers on their rights. After indicating, for the previous year, the figure of 
70 billion euros as the loss of the Italian state for corrupt practices, the organisation 
warned that all social sectors were getting accustomed to a ‘culture of corruption’ and 
that indignation for such culture was slowly fading. No specific responsibility for 
corruption was apportioned to organised crime, as the regions in which the growth of 
the phenomenon was observed were not those in which organised crime traditionally 
operates.  
    According to J2, criminal organisations such as the mafia are the most visible 
version of a way of exercising power. Members of the mafia „are used by the state, 
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they are protected, and then, when they are no longer needed, they are dumped‟. In 
this perspective, ‘if we want to understand the relationship between corruption and 
organised crime we have to rid ourselves of all the stereotypes and prejudices, and 
look at these phenomena against the background of the power elite‟ (J2).  
   This informant qualified his view by arguing that political activity has by now 
become a straightforward form of business, in which individuals and groups are 
connected in a pyramidal configuration. These connections are national, and often, 
international expressions of power, global systems based on the control by the few 
upon the many. ‘This is organised abuse of power, which causes injustice and social 
suffering. This pyramidal configuration offers some space to organised crime‟ (J2). In 
this perspective, therefore, organised crime uses corruption because everyone else 
does. A people is what a ruling class makes it, said J2 echoing Rousseau. A ruling 
class that degrades the people is in turn degraded by it in a vicious circle. „The ruling 
class rules also the formation of public opinion, it selects the collective memory, it 
chooses which values are to be regarded as important. Organised crime just follows 
the general climate determined by the ruling class‟ (J2). 
   In the view of J3, instead, the institutional actors who are more vulnerable to 
corruption by organised crime are local politicians and administrators. These actors 
handle public resources, are geographically close to organised criminal groups, and 
operate in the same social environment, therefore they are subject to the pressure that 
such groups exert. At the local level, however, corrupt exchange ‘proposed’ by 
organised crime to politicians is accompanied by an implicit degree of intimidation 
which determines the outcome of the proposal made. Informant A1, in this respect, 
talked about the well known ‘offers that cannot be refused’. „In other words, it is 
possible that a corrupt offer is rejected, but then intimidation follows against the 
person who does not want to be corrupted. The outcome will be the same, namely the 
illegal result that was initially pursued. In such cases, before even attempting to 
corrupt, organised crime aims to intimidate. At times, acceptance of a corrupt 
proposal may turn into quasi-affiliation with the organised group‟ (A1). 
   Informants also stressed that when organised crime manages to corrupt any actor, 
this is due to the low professional ethics of those who make themselves available to 
corruption.  
 
„There is little sense of responsibility for the role one occupies, be it public or private. 
This may be difficult to evaluate in empirical terms, but the deficit of political and 
civic culture in a country exposes citizens to systemic corruption, by organised crime, 
but also by other individuals and groups. In such contexts, even emulation – the 
desire to access prestigious positions and gain more financial resources than one 
holds – may become a significant variable‟ (A2).  
 
Emulation, as mentioned by this informant, plays a role in tax evasion, whereby small 
earners feel legitimised to escape their dues to the state when witnessing the spectacle 
of massive illegality by the elite. Tax evasion in Italy reaches such level that the state, 
regularly, proposes ‘social pacts’ or amnesties requiring the payment of at least a 
portion of the unpaid sums. Vulnerability to corruption, ultimately, may also be 
exacerbated by impunity, namely the certainty that there will be no prosecution. 
Except for the period of ‘clean hands’, corrupted and corruptors have rarely been 
punished, judicially as well as morally (Della Porta and Vannucci, 2007). 
 
Corrupt sectors  
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Fraud against the state shows the most remarkable expansion among other corrupt 
practices. This includes a range of false claims for financial entitlements and special 
state support, or consist of payment requests for fictitious work performed or 
incomplete services delivered (Davigo and Mannozzi, 2008). These practices went up 
during the last two years by 40% and 200% respectively (Alto Commissario 
Anticorruzione, 2007). The increase is not solely due to the growing interest of 
organised crime in state funds, but also to the spreading of fraudulent conducts among 
professionals, administrators and private firms (see the list of recent cases provided 
above).  
   A corollary of this sector is constituted by fraud against the European Union. In 
2007 some 6,000 irregularities were reported to the European Fraud Prevention Office 
by member state agencies (Quirke, 2009). The European budget attracts professionals, 
criminal groups and opportunistic entrepreneurs who may resort to fraud as a means 
of rescuing a failing company or expanding its business. It is hard to establish how 
many of these irregularities were committed by Italian actors, let alone how many by 
Italian criminal groups. What is of interest, in this respect, is a case brought to light by 
investigative journalists, who tracked a company operating in Trapani (Sicily) 
specialising in the construction of wind turbines financed by the EU. The turbines 
producing alternative energy are now spread across Sicily, but only seven out of 
thirty-three of these ecologically-friendly wind farms are actually functioning. Most 
turbines just stand there, unconnected to any machinery transforming the wind into 
energy (Giacalone, 2009).  
   Returning to the national level, the construction sector is another of the sectors 
particularly exposed to corruption. The involvement of organised crime, here, may 
cover a plurality of industrial segments, ranging from the production of cement to the 
building and refinement of the constructions commissioned. Licit entrepreneurs are 
also involved, particularly in areas where environmental planning is vague, control 
regulations are weak, and administrators are willing to help developers by claiming 
that the areas sold are destined for private dwellings.  
   In the sector of public works the formation of cartels is frequent. Auctions and 
tenders relating to such works are manipulated, and when organised crime is involved 
the employment of ‘clean’ business partners and professionals becomes necessary. 
According to informant J1: 
 
„White collars and organised criminals, in this sector operate jointly. They may even 
identify which service has to be put out to tender and what type of good has to be 
delivered. So, basically, the contract gained will not serve a specific need of the 
community, but only the financial interests of those contracted. When planning what 
type of service has to be contracted out, the role of politicians is crucial. 
Subsequently, corruption may occur when the criteria for the granting of the contract 
have to be established.  Those manipulating the tendering process will make sure that 
their competitors do not meet the criteria. When the bid is presented, the situation 
may arise where there is only one company left in the contest, although the winner 
will make a series of bids as if other companies were still competing‟ (J1).  
 
Finally, at the execution phase, the winner may sub-contract parts of the works to a 
friendly firm. If the bid made is low and unrealistic, the winning company may even 
plan not to complete the works for lack of sufficient funds. The ‘rubbish emergency’ 
listed among the cases above is one such case, where the failure of the legitimate 
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entrepreneurs to honour a contract gave the opportunity to organised crime to offer its 
own, alternative disposal services. Similarly, companies failing to perform the tasks 
for which they have been paid may resort to sub-contracts with firms controlled by 
organised crime.    
   The sector of public contracts constitutes an extremely important area for the 
economy of the country. ‘Through public contracts, the state guarantees the 
realisation of infrastructures and the delivery of services to citizens. This is an 
essential function to encourage development and remove the economic and social 
obstacles limiting the freedom and equality of citizens’ (Caneppele, 2009: 7). The 
allocation of public contracts, however, needs impartial, efficient, and morally reliable  
administrators, who hand over public resources to those who are actually able to 
deliver at the appropriate standard and, simultaneously, at the minimum cost for the 
collectivity. Where such administrators are wanting, chances are offered to 
adventurous entrepreneurs and organised crime.   
   Public contracts are attractive for a number of reasons. First, they represent an 
important part of the resources available in specific contexts, particularly in regions in 
which private entrepreneurship is insufficiently developed (Commissione 
Parlamentare Antimafia, 2008). In Calabria, for instance, public finances constitute 
80% of the financial assets available in the region. Second, fraudulent conduct in the 
arena of public contracts is met with particular leniency by institutional agencies, and 
when organised crime is involved, investigations require complex tools and skills. 
Organised criminals turned into businessmen, therefore, may opt for this area of 
investment for the excellent prospects it offers in terms of revenues and for the 
negligible risk of apprehension. Third, public contracts are managed by vulnerable 
and inefficient public administrators, and have long been characterised by unorthodox 
behaviour and corrupt exchange between private entrepreneurs, political 
representatives and public administrators.  
 
‘The infiltration of mafia organisations is therefore favoured by the spreading of illicit 
conduct and corruption within the public administration itself. Such an environment is 
more permeable to the presence of actors who are associated with criminal 
organisations due to the low level of legality that characterises them’ (Calderoni and 
Caneppele, 2009: 8).  
 
Finally, criminal organisations may benefit form public contracts in terms of prestige 
and power in the territories they control. For example, they may realistically play the 
role of employers, whether for their affiliates or for members of the general 
population. They may gain access to the business world, encountering peers and 
colleagues who may be helpful in future enterprises. In brief, they may progress in 
their career combining involvement in licit as well as illicit markets. Even when 
organised criminal groups do not succeed in gaining contracts, they act as mediators 
for other companies, activating their political relationships or their ‘persuasive’ 
means. In some cases, it is the winning company which will contact a criminal 
organisations, ‘in order to agree in advance on the protection money due, thus 
avoiding future problems when works are in progress’ (ibid: 8).  
 
‘The phenomenon of criminal infiltration is distributed equally across the regions of 
the South of Italy. It is, however, mainly concentrated in Calabria and Sicily, and in 
some provinces of Campania: Caserta and Naples. The situation is critical in Calabria, 
where the ‘Ndrangheta has enjoyed until very recently little attention by public 
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opinion and institutions. This has allowed it to expand beyond the Calabrese territory. 
Today the situation has changed and, as happened in Sicily after the massacre of 
judges and in Campania with the camorra wars, the Calabrese organisation too is at 
the centre of numerous investigations’ (ibid: 127). 
 
Targeted institutions 
 
Corruption of the justice system, including administrative staff, publicly appointed 
officials and judges, increased between 2005 and 2007 (Help Consumatori, 2007). 
The increase, however, may not be statistically significant, as the cases of corruption 
were 8 in 2005 and 10 in 2007. What may be of interest is in which Italian region 
such cases occurred: Emilia Romagna, Lazio and Lombardy, namely in regions in 
which organised crime activity is not as prevalent as elsewhere. Judiciary corruption, 
therefore, can be mainly imputed to white collar offenders, either in the political or in 
the economic sphere. Some commentators, however, suggest that the increase signals 
both the ‘migration’ of organised crime to other regions and the spreading of the 
‘mafia method’ throughout the country. According to A2:  
 
„The police and the judiciary seem less permeable to corruption, also because they 
can rely on a higher degree of internal cohesion and have a distinctive ésprit de 
corps. Unlike for politicians and administrators, the career of police and judges can 
hardly be influenced by organised crime, whose power to corrupt, after all, consists in 
large measure of paying money. Finally, they are less vulnerable to intimidation, 
because they feel protected by their peers, they are more homogenous and less 
competitive with one another‟ (A2). 
 
The corruption of the judiciary, according to J1, is associated with the inefficient and 
particularly lengthy investigation processes. Judges are given a precise deadline by 
which investigation has to be completed so that prosecution may commence. Failure 
to meet the deadline results in the offence being cancelled. Corrupt judges may 
prolong the times of the investigation on purpose, thus favouring the release of 
defendants.  
   A well know case in Italy, involving judge Carnevale, resulted in the Court of 
Cassation invalidating all the previous trials in which mafia members had been found 
guilty. The invalidation was motivated with some procedural irregularities. The judge, 
eventually, was prosecuted and expelled from the judiciary.  
   Informant J1 mentioned cases in which police officers were in good working 
relationships with people who were on the run from justice, or with people who were 
in the process of being arrested or investigated. „These officers, therefore, informed 
members of the criminal world that something was going to happen to them, giving 
them time to hide, destroy documents or find an alibi‟. In such cases, J1 added, sub-
cultural factors play an important role, as ‘the police officers may share a background 
of bullying, violence and criminality with the ones they are supposed to police‟.  
   Informant J2 argued that all forms of stacking resources, be they private or public, 
imply a certain degree of corruption. The political world is central in this respect. The 
fact is, he said, that „In politics, many people find a solution to their economic 
problems, and they try to occupy all the possible places where resources are 
distributed. Around elected politicians there are then cohorts of allies who participate 
in political activity and share some of the wealth. Finally, at the bottom, there are the 
masses, the subjects who sustain the whole system on their shoulders‟ (J2). 
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This informant was reluctant to assert that the political system is corrupted by 
organised crime. He would rather claim that organised crime takes advantage of a 
corrupt and inefficient system.  
 
„Take the example of the public financing of political parties. This was introduced 
after the scandals proved that businessmen (oil producer, developers, the 
pharmaceutical industry, and many more) were receiving favours from politicians in 
exchange for money. These favours consisted in pieces of legislation that brought 
enormous amounts of money to entrepreneurs. The new law on the public funding of 
political parties was supposed to make the costs of political activity more transparent. 
But it was a big lie: politicians and economic actors continued with the occult 
financing of one another. The result now is that, while occult financing continues, we 
have the European most expensive public system of pouring money into politics, with 
even small parties (who do not have a significant number of representatives) 
receiving exorbitant amounts of money. Organised crime, in all this, is just one of the 
many actors involved; they appropriate resources like everybody else‟ (J2). 
 
This view was shared by A2, who considers the political sphere the most vulnerable 
to corruption by organised crime. This is because power groups tend to come together 
irrespective of the nature of the power they exercise. Politicians collude for the 
obvious reason that organised crime controls votes, particularly at the local level. 
From the point of view of organised crime, on the other hand, corruption does not 
only lead to the control of contracts and resources, but also to an expansion of 
influence and power.   
   We have seen in the sections above the role played by politicians and administrators 
in the arena of public contracts. A brief addiction to the information already 
presented, came form informant A2, who argued that administrators are accustomed 
to exchanging favours for illegal income, due to the general climate in which they 
find themselves operating. Some of them become public administrators on the basis of 
nepotism or as a result of some corrupt exchange of sort. Posts in the public 
administration may be distributed by influential figures, with the participation of 
political parties claiming their own share of jobs for their faithful members. Once in 
post, administrators are surrounded by ‘clients’ of varied nature, friends and relatives, 
colleagues and acquaintances who formulate incessant requests and propose creative 
bargains. ‘Organised crime swims at ease in such corrupt waters. And administrators 
will be unable or unwilling to determine whether the companies they entrust with a 
public work is owned by a clean entrepreneur, a criminal one, or a partnership 
between the two‟ (A2). 
   Informants concurred that in the south of the country administrative corruption is 
more visible. In the southern regions, investigations focusing on organised crime lead 
to the discovery that somewhere, behind the scenes, there is a local administrator or a 
politician, and that in proximity lies a businessman: the labyrinth of power and 
business emerges very clearly. However,  
 
„In the north of the country power is just as corrupt, with a relatively lower presence 
of organised crime. The problem is that it is no longer possible to distinguish between 
organised crime and white collar crime‟ (J2).  
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   According to A2 the private sector occupies third position in the corruption echelon. 
Entrepreneurs were deemed lacking a proper ethic of the market, and prone to grasp 
any possibility of operating in monopoly conditions. ‘Escaping competition has 
become acceptable, and for some, in a sense, even legal‟. In a qualification adding to 
statements reported above: 
 
„In some contexts the criminal can turn into a private entrepreneur. He will conduct a 
series of legitimate activities with the illicit money accumulated. Also, the criminal 
may have to employ those affiliated with his organisation, and therefore give salaries 
in licit occupations. The mafia is an employer, let us not forget. Moreover, organised 
crime is a money lending organisation, and at times, when the debtors become 
insolvent, their business is appropriated by the lending organisation. This is one of 
the other ways in which organised crime gains access to the official economy‟ (A2).  
 
While informant J1 felt that organised crime turned into business, thanks to the 
support of politicians, can renounce intimidation, J2 dwelt again on the general 
economic practices prevailing in the country. In his view all economic sectors are 
corrupt: ALL! At all levels of their respective hierarchy. The reason for this 
generalised diffusion of corrupt exchange is that: 
 
„We have now a criminal system that works by inertia: it has its own inherent motion. 
We have a system which is integrated, composed of different characters and entities, 
not all of which have criminal professionalism. We have the politician, the high public 
manager, the entrepreneur, the financier, the mediator, the representative of the 
institutions, and at times a representative of the mafia. The system is modular, in the 
sense that, according to the circumstances, it includes new actors and excludes 
others‟ (J2). 
 
To remedy this situation is extremely hard. Even whistleblowers, in the private sector, 
do not function as examples to others. They are often ostracised, while the corrupt are 
still seen in the most glamorous public events and on TV. This is the result of the 
organic partnerships between business, politicians and organised crime. We are faced 
with post-mafia organisations, in the sense that in the past we could identify some 
figures of the official world who were ‘external’ allies of the mafia; now it is the 
mafia which is external to the illicit business of the ruling elite.  
 
„Organised crime is not just a vile association of butchers led by shepherds and 
peasants. It the mafia were composed only of semi-literate people it would have been 
destroyed a long time ago. The problem is that the ruling class has never managed to 
make the transition from a system based on wild and violent accumulation to a social 
order respectful of legality based on shared values. The elite in Italy has never really 
renounced violence. See the examples of state terrorism scattered along the history of 
the country. The ruling class has evolved from pre-modernity directly into post-
modernity: this may explain the strong relationship between corruption and organised 
crime‟ (J2). 
 
Conclusion 
 
Corruption and organised crime in Italy are closely intertwined to the point that, when 
investigating episodes of corruption the involvement of some criminal organisation is 
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discovered, and vice versa, when investigating the exploits of organised crime, the 
involvement of some corrupt politician or entrepreneur often comes to light. The 
relationship between corruption and organised crime in the country, however, does 
not lend itself to conventional analyses imputing to the latter the main responsibility 
for the spreading of the former. The opposite too seems to obtain in Italy, where the 
claim can be safely made that widespread corruption within the social, economic and 
political spheres attracts organised criminal groups, encouraging them to participate in 
corrupt exchange and indirectly boosting their other various illicit activities. 
   This research note has shown that corruption and organised crime, in Italy, are 
connected in a variety of ways. With the political, administrative and private sectors 
particularly prone to engage in corrupt exchange, illicit conduct tends to spread to 
many other groups and actors. Upturning a liberalist metaphor, we could say that the 
elite has not promoted a ‘trickling down’ process whereby wealth is distributed across 
the country, but has encouraged a process in which what actually ‘trickles down’ is 
illegality. Organised crime is a participant in this illegality, at times aided by 
intimidation, at times sustained by the interests of legitimate actors who play a de 
facto role of partners. In such a situation resources are not used to satisfy the needs of 
communities, but are appropriated through personal initiative, individual risk, power, 
the ability to outflank rules and to achieve impunity. Corrupt behaviour in Italy has 
slowly become acceptable at the social level, to then gain legitimacy at the political, 
and finally at the legislative level. Corruption has played the function of a 
foundational conduct, one that lends itself to be imitated. It has altered the perception 
of what citizens should expect, what they should pursue and how. It has taken on a 
‘founding force’, namely the capacity to impose a lifestyle, to transform the previous 
jurisprudence, to establish new laws and new types of legitimacy. Corruption and 
organised crime, in sum, are intertwined in a ‘criminal system’ that reproduces power, 
be it illicit or otherwise. As Enrico Ferri (1884: 264) said more than a century ago: 
 
‘Respect for the law spreads among the people less because of police and jails than 
because of the example given by persons in high places and by the authorities 
themselves, when they are first to put into practice respect for individual and social 
right… Thus avoiding the scandals of impunity for the big thieves and the most 
iniquitous severity for the little ones’. 
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